


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
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
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
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


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
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THE YEMENS: Sana leaders' views on unity agreement.  
(Page 8)



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BOLIVIA: Threat of political crisis eases (Page 11)



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THE YEMENS: Sana's leaders intend to press for Yemeni union on their own terms.

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[redacted] President Iryani and Prime Minister al-Ayni believe that the legislature in Sana can be persuaded to approve unity--whether or not it is actually possible--on the condition that its implementation will not contravene Sana's constitution. This condition, they feel, will force Aden either to accept an agreement which would spell the end of its Marxist government or to reject unity, thereby drawing the opprobrium of the Arab world. [redacted]

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Sana's leaders reportedly are convinced that, in an election for union government, Sana would come out on top because of its approximately five-to-one population advantage. Iryani recently said as much to the US chargé, predicting that Sana would "swallow" Aden.

These attitudes [redacted]

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[redacted] indicate a simplistic view of how Aden will react to Sana's challenge and fail to take into account the likelihood that Aden will have conditions of its own for agreeing to union. The officials in Sana also appear to be overlooking the extent of domestic opposition to unity. Although presently muted, opposition is extensive, encompassing not only elements among the military but also Adeni dissidents in Sana [redacted]

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The activities of the dissidents notwithstanding, steps are now being undertaken to implement the initial provisions of the unity agreement. The two sides reportedly have worked out arrangements for the withdrawal of their armies from the border within a few days. Following this, the borders are

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to be opened to travelers from both countries; air traffic between the two capitals was resumed on 11 November after a two-month interruption. [REDACTED]

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NOTES

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**BOLIVIA:** The threat of a government crisis has eased with the postponement of a general strike, but the Banzer regime is still having serious difficulty coping with the consequences of devaluation. The prospect of renewed labor violence reportedly led to an intensification of unrest within the armed forces [redacted] but key officers' pledges of support for Banzer indicate that he will be given another chance to improve on the governing coalition's inept handling of the monetary reform. The regime is apparently looking for a compromise on wages that will avert a strike without negating the potential benefits of devaluation. The strike deadline is now set for 20 November. Banzer's performance this weekend will be under close scrutiny by armed forces [redacted]

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